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AVOIDING THE SACK: HOW
NEBRASKA’S DEPARTURE FROM THE
BIG 12 CHANGED COLLEGE
FOOTBALL AND WHAT ATHLETIC
CONFERENCES MUST DO TO PREVENT
DEFECTION IN THE FUTURE
I. INTRODUCTION
On December 5, 2009, the University of Nebraska (Nebraska) lost the Big
12 Championship Game to the University of Texas (Texas). 1 One year later,
Nebraska again lost the Big 12 Championship Game to the University of
Oklahoma, in what would be Nebraska’s final Big 12 game, and the final Big
12 Championship Game. 2 Those consecutive conference championship losses
cost Nebraska a chance to play in some of the most prestigious bowl games in
college football and may have included a loss of recruits, lower ticket sales,
and a disappointed fan base. One thing that Nebraska undoubtedly lost,
though, was a chance for higher revenue.
There is no doubt that college football has become a huge business. In
fact, the conferences that had teams participate in the five most important
college football games—the Bowl Championship Series (BCS) games—
received a share of almost $170 million for the 2010–2011 post-season.3
Colleges spend enormous amounts of money on recruiting high school players,
team travel, coaches’ salaries, scholarships for athletes, academic and other
types of support for the athletes, and their athletic programs in general. 4 In
return, these institutions earn revenues that some publicly traded companies
cannot dream of matching. 5 College football is also organized like a business,
1. Wendell Barnhouse, Texas Wins Dr. Pepper Big 12 Football Championship, BIG 12
CONFERENCE (Dec. 5, 2009), http://www.big12sports.com/ViewArticle.dbml?&DB_OEM_ID=10410
&ATCLID=204844868.
2. Wendell Barnhouse, Sooners Win Big 12 Championship, BIG 12 CONFERENCE (Dec. 4, 2010),
http://www.big12sports.com/ViewArticle.dbml?&DB_OEM_ID=10410&ATCLID=205042841.
3. Revenue Distribution Data Released, BCS (Jan. 25, 2011), http://www.bcsfootball.org/news
/story?id=6057935.
4. See Jack Gillum et al., College Athletics Soaking Up Subsidies, Fees; Findings Called
‘Appalling’ Amid School Funding Crisis, USA TODAY, Jan. 14, 2010, at 1A.
5. See Molly Reppen, Athletic Department Produces 10th Highest Revenue in U.S., THE DAILY
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where almost every Football Bowl Subdivision (FBS) school is part of a
voluntary association, known as a college athletic conference.
Since the final whistle of that 2010 Big 12 Championship Game sounded,
the college football landscape has changed drastically. Twenty-two different
schools with FBS football programs have joined, or agreed to join, a new
conference. 6 Two of those schools, Boise State University and Texas
Christian University, changed conferences twice during this period without
ever playing a game. 7 While each school’s departure had ripple effects, some
were larger than others. Nebraska was one of the first schools to change
conferences during this frenetic period and is, arguably, still the biggest name
football program to do so.
Nebraska was a member of the private association known as the Big 12
Conference (Big 12) from the conference’s inception in 1996, 8 and was a
member of the Big 8 Conference before that. 9 In 2010, Nebraska formally
applied to become a member of the Big Ten Conference (Big Ten), and the
application was approved by the Big Ten Conference Council of Presidents
and Chancellors. 10 The Nebraska Cornhuskers officially made the move and
began competing in the Big Ten during the Fall 2011 sports season.11 When
Nebraska decided to join the Big Ten, it necessarily meant that Nebraska also
decided to end its relationship with the Big 12, creating great economic and
legal ramifications.
This Comment will discuss the ramifications of conference realignment on
the conferences and the universities involved and will discuss ways for
conferences to protect themselves in these situations. Nebraska’s departure
from the Big 12 will be the focus of this Comment because it was one of the
first dominos to fall and nearly caused the collapse of the Big 12. Part II of
this Comment will discuss how the Big 12 is organized. Part III will then
discuss the legal issues involved when a university terminates its relationship
CARDINAL (Univ. of Wis.-Madison), Dec. 9, 2010, http://host.madison.com/dailycardinal/news/athletic-department-produces-th-highest-revenue-in-u-s/article_f2ab9fd0-857a-580cbd1c-bf07fbb2f2af.html.
6. See History of Conference Realignment, NBCSPORTS, http://nbcsports.msnbc.com/id/37689
691/ (last visited Mar. 23, 2012).
7. See id.
8. The Big 12 Conference – Outstanding Success, BIG 12 CONFERENCE (Nov. 28, 2010),
http://www.big12sports.com/ViewArticle.dbml?DB_OED_ID=10410&KEY=&ATCLID=1514841.
9. Conference Timeline - Big 8, HUSKERS.COM (July 1, 2011), http://www.huskers.com/View
Article.dbml?DB_OEM_ID=100&ATCLID=205175754.
10. Big Ten Officially Accepts Nebraska, HUSKERS.COM (June 11, 2010), http://www.huskers.
com/ViewArticle.dbml?SPSID=173&SPID=41&DB_OEM_ID=100&ATCLID=204958959
[hereinafter Nebraska Accepted].
11. Id.
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with an athletic conference. This discussion will focus on contracts,
specifically contractual obligations and related remedies for breaching these
contracts. Part III will also discuss the law of private associations, which
generally governs conference actions. Part IV will discuss other instances of
conference defection and the legal ramifications for the universities that left
their athletic conferences. Part V will discuss Nebraska’s and, to a lesser
extent, the University of Colorado’s (Colorado) decision to leave the Big 12 in
2010. Part VI suggests ways for the Big 12 and other conferences to include
additional protections from defection in their contracts with universities and
addresses the practicality of these suggestions. Finally, in Part VII, this
Comment concludes that media revenue sharing and rights pooling are the best
ways to ensure survival, but only if those provisions are upheld when they are
eventually challenged.
II. THE BIG 12 CONFERENCE
The Big 12 was formed after the 1995 football season and officially began
play in the fall of 1996. 12 As a member of the Big 12, Nebraska had to abide
by the conference bylaws, which required the school to pay membership
assessments at the end of the Big 12’s fiscal year.13 These assessments are
taken from the final distribution due to each institution at the end of the year.14
The revenue that each school receives is based on the total pool of revenues
earned by all conference members. 15 The percentage each school gets for
football is based on a number of factors, including television revenues,
appearance fees, and bowl game appearances, among other things. 16
The Big 12 is organized much like other nonprofit corporations, with a
board of directors comprised of the Chief Executive Officer of each member
institution (usually a President or Chancellor).17 There is also a Council of
Faculty Athletic Representatives, a Board of Athletic Directors, and a Board of
Senior Woman Administrators. 18 Through this structure, the Big 12 acts in

12. 2 EDSON A. BEARG & THOMAS R. RUDEBUSCH, INSIDE THE PROGRAM: A HISTORY OF
COLLEGE FOOTBALL, THE GOLDEN AGE OF THE 1950’S TO THE MODERN ERA 251 (2006).
13. BIG 12 CONF., BIG 12 CONF. 2010–11 HANDBOOK art. II, § 2.2, at 1, 12, available at
http://www.big12sports.com/fls/10410/pdfs/handbook/ConferenceHandbook.pdf?DB_OEM_ID=104
10 (last visited Mar. 23, 2012) [hereinafter HANDBOOK].
14. Id.
15. See id. art. II, §§ 2.4–2.10, at 12–13.
16. Id.
17. Id. art. V, § 5.1.1, at 15.
18. Id. art. V, §§ 5.1.2–5.1.4, at 15–16.
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the interests of all its member institutions.19 However, the Big 12 is still a
separate entity from its institutions and, thus, needs to structure its contracts
with the individual institutions in ways that allow the Big 12 to protect itself.
III. LEGAL ISSUES INVOLVED IN A UNIVERSITY LEAVING AN ATHLETIC
CONFERENCE
Collegiate conferences are collections of colleges and universities that
decide to form voluntary associations. Like the leaders of most entities in
today’s society, conference leaders must be concerned with many areas of law.
Contract law and the law of private associations, however, are the primary
areas of the law that conference leaders must be aware of in regard to
relationships with its member universities.
A. Contracts
When an individual school wants to join the Big 12, there are certain
membership requirements the institution must meet. 20 These requirements are
found in the Certificate of Incorporation, the Big 12 bylaws, and the Big 12
rules. 21 Once a school joins the Big 12, it is bound by all the rules and
regulations of the conference.22 Additionally, if an institution chooses to
withdraw from the Big 12, there are specific procedures and penalties that the
Big 12 may enforce, which will be discussed further in Part V of this
Comment. 23 These rules and obligations materialize through a contract
between each individual member institution and the Big 12.
In any context, when there is a contract in place, each party to the contract
expects every other party to perform the action that was agreed to in the
contract. 24 If one party to the contract in some way breaches or does not
fulfill his duties, the other party is entitled to remedies that would put that
party in the same position it would have been in if the original contract was
fulfilled. 25 The types of remedies vary by the contract but are most often
monetary damages. 26 When the parties come together to form a contract,

19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
2000).
25.
26.

See id. art. I, § 1.3.1, at 1.
See id. art. I, § 1.2.3, at 1.
Id.
See generally id.
Id. art. III, § 3.1–3.3, at 13–14.
CLAUDE D. ROHWER & ANTHONY M. SKROCKI, CONTRACTS IN A NUTSHELL 433 (5th ed.
Id. at 433–34.
Id. at 433.
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damages can be negotiated into the contract itself, which might include a
formula for determining damages or a specified amount of money. 27
Sometimes, it is also possible to have a court force the breaching party to
perform its obligations under the contract, using a theory of specific
performance. 28
Contracts can also have a large effect on third parties who did not
negotiate the terms. In the collegiate athletic conference context, at least one
court has been called upon to consider whether the contractual obligations
owed by a university to its conference have any effect on the students.29 In
Hairston v. Pacific 10 Conference, the student-plaintiff tried to argue that
there were obligations between the conference and the students related to
providing an opportunity to play intercollegiate athletics and receiving the
benefits involved in those sports, but the court dismissed that argument. 30 The
court specifically stated that no breach of contract claim existed because no
language in the contract showed that the Pacific 10 Conference (Pac-10)
intended to obligate itself to the students. 31 This ruling indicates that a
conference has valid contracts only with the universities, and the courts are
probably not willing to read more into a contract between a conference and its
member universities than the parties clearly intended, based on the contract
itself.
B. Law of Private Associations
Athletic conferences are private associations that exist only because of
agreements among their members, created by contracts. However, when a
dispute arises that is not specifically about these contracts, some parties may
want to challenge a conference’s rules. Courts will usually respect an
association’s rules and decisions unless the plaintiff can show that the rules
should not be followed because of mistake, fraud, illegality, collusion, or
arbitrariness. 32 In Gulf South Conference v. Boyd, a student-athlete brought
suit against the Gulf South Conference, seeking a declaratory judgment that he
was eligible to play football. 33 The Supreme Court of Alabama considered the
conference’s argument that the lower court had no jurisdiction and said that
27. Id. at 436.
28. Id. at 438.
29. See generally Hairston v. Pac. 10 Conf., 101 F.3d 1315 (9th Cir. 1996).
30. Id. at 1320.
31. Id.
32. See, e.g., Harper v. Hoecherl, 14 So. 2d 179 (Fla. 1943); Blackshire v. NAACP, Inc., 673
N.E.2d 1059 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996).
33. Gulf S. Conf. v. Boyd, 369 So. 2d 553, 554 (Ala. 1979).
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the dispute was clearly governed by common law regarding private
associations. 34 The court noted that generally, “courts should not interfere
with the internal management of such associations.” 35 The court reasoned that
people or entities should be able to choose with whom to associate and in what
manner and pointed out that courts would not have a workable standard of
review for the reasonableness of an association’s rules. 36 Universities, unlike
students, choose to associate with certain conferences and, therefore, the
general noninterference doctrine for private associations applies, and the court
will not inhibit the management of the associations. 37
To a certain extent, courts may be willing to give athletic conferences
even more deference than other private associations because the conferences
are tied to educational institutions. In a case challenging the tax status of an
Atlantic Coast Conference (ACC) owned sports facility, the North Carolina
Court of Appeals held that the operations and contracts of the conference are
incidental to operating the educational institutions.38 In its analysis, the court
clearly distinguished athletic conferences from commercial associations and
gave the ACC the flexibility to call the sports facility at issue an educational
facility. 39 The court went on to state that management of network agreements
and broadcasts is incidental to the operation of the universities, just like the
maintenance of a parking lot.40 This management is usually left to the
conferences rather than individual institutions, so conferences like the ACC
are in some ways extensions of their members. The court also looked to the
uses and purposes of the building in question. 41 It found that the ACC’s role
is primarily to promote collegiate athletics by instructing students and
developing those students’ skills. 42 The court’s conclusion that the conference
was an educational entity allowed the ACC to remain tax-exempt but also set a
precedent of giving vast deference to college athletic conferences. This
deference may prompt other plaintiffs to look to alternative areas of law for
claims to bring against collegiate conferences.

34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Id. at 556.
Id.
Id. at 556–57.
See id. at 557.
See In re Appeal of Atl. Coast Conf., 434 S.E.2d 865, 870 (N.C. Ct. App. 1993).
Id. at 871.
Id. at 870.
Id.
Id.
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C. Other Areas of Law
Antitrust and fiduciary duties are the other areas of the law that plaintiffs
are very likely to consider. Antitrust law cases are likely to be filed only by
other institutions that feel left out by the conference structures and
membership requirements rather than individuals because those organizations
have much more to gain and can better afford the litigation expenses involved.
If a plaintiff was considering an antitrust suit, that plaintiff would first look to
the Sherman Act. Section One of the Sherman Act states, “Every contract,
combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of
trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is hereby
declared to be illegal.”43 Although universities in conferences are usually
located in several different states, each university has contractual obligations
to a single conference entity, so it could be argued that these agreements are in
violation of the Sherman Act. If the agreements between the universities and
conferences were found to be in violation of the Sherman Act, the conferences
would not be able to enforce the obligations of members or damages owed by
universities that leave the conferences. Analysis of any antitrust claim that
might stem from Nebraska’s agreement with the Big 12 and other member
schools is beyond the scope of this Comment, which will focus solely on the
contractual issues involved.
The other area of law likely to be implicated in a collegiate conference
lawsuit is the area of fiduciary duties. Black’s Law Dictionary defines a
fiduciary duty as “[a] duty of utmost good faith, trust, confidence, and candor
owed by a fiduciary . . . to the beneficiary . . . ; a duty to act with the highest
degree of honesty and loyalty toward another person and in the best interests
of the other person.” 44 Other conference members may want to file a claim
against Nebraska alleging that, by leaving the Big 12, Nebraska breached its
fiduciary duties to those members. Again, these claims will not be discussed
because they are beyond the scope of this Comment, which is focused on
contractual obligations and remedies.
Although several areas of law affect conferences and many decisions
involving the conferences deal with different types of contractual obligations,
there is a recognizable trend when these issues are litigated. The trend seems
to be that courts will give college athletic conferences a large amount of
deference in both the operation of college athletics and the contractual
obligations that the conferences undertake.

43. Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2011).
44. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 581 (9th ed. 2009).
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IV. OTHER CONFERENCE DEFECTIONS AND THE LEGAL RAMIFICATIONS OF
THOSE WITHDRAWALS
Conference realignment is nothing new in college sports, and movement
among conferences, at least on the Division I FBS level, is almost always to
help a college’s football or men’s basketball program. Between 1990 and
2008, about thirty schools changed conferences, including about twenty in
2003 alone. 45 Most of the movement in 2003 began with several schools
leaving the Big East Conference (Big East) for the ACC and the Big East
filling those vacancies with schools from Conference USA. 46 Institutions and
conferences have different motivations for realignment, but it seems clear that
revenue is the largest driving force in all of these decisions. The schools want
to garner more television revenues by participating in more popular
conferences and conference championship games, while the conferences look
for member schools that help the conferences tap into larger television
markets. 47
A. The Big East in 2003
As a result of the realignment involving the Big East and the ACC,
lawsuits were filed. 48 The University of Connecticut, the University of
Pittsburgh (Pittsburgh), Rutgers University, and West Virginia University
(WVU) filed suit against the ACC. 49 All of these schools were members of
the Big East and claimed that the ACC wrongfully coerced members of the
Big East to breach contractual obligations and fiduciary duties owed to them
and to join the ACC. 50 The court found that the suit was against the ACC
itself and, therefore, no personal jurisdiction existed in Connecticut based on
insufficient contacts with the state. 51 The ACC’s motion to dismiss was
granted. 52 In another case stemming from this realignment, Boston College
(BC) filed suit against the Big East, claiming that an amended constitutional

45. Beth Rosenberg, Domino Effect: Division I-A Conference Realignment Has Had Emotional,
Structural Impact, NCAA (Dec. 8, 2003), http://fs.ncaa.org/Docs/NCAANewsArchive/2003/Division
+I/domino+effect+-+12-8-03.html.
46. DANIEL COVELL & CAROL A. BARR, MANAGING INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS 87 (2010).
47. See id.
48. See generally Trs. of Bos. Coll. v. Big E. Conf., No. 03-4818, 2004 Mass. Super. LEXIS 298
(Mass. Super. Ct. Aug. 18, 2004); Univ. of Conn. v. Atl. Coast Conf., No. X07CV030082695S, 2004
Conn. Super. LEXIS 368 (Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 23, 2004).
49. Univ. of Conn., 2004 Conn. Super. LEXIS 368, at *1.
50. Id.
51. Id. at *8.
52. Id. at *13.
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provision that increased penalties for leaving was invalid. 53 This suit came
about because, after the withdrawal of the University of Miami and Virginia
Tech from the Big East, the conference and its member schools wanted to
protect themselves. 54 Therefore, the Big East increased the penalty for
withdrawal from $1 million to $5 million and the notice period from 12
months to 27 months. 55 BC alleged that the increased penalty amount and
withdrawal period were invalid.56 The court granted BC’s motion for
summary judgment and denied the Big East’s motion. 57 The fact that both
cases were disposed of early in litigation leaves unanswered questions about
the duties of the schools and conferences and the relationships between the
parties.
The cases do seem to support the notion that the relationships are
completely based on contracts. The plaintiff-schools in University of
Connecticut v. Atlantic Coast Conference also tried to further the idea that the
schools leaving the conference were breaching not only contractual obligations
but fiduciary duties as well. 58
B. The Big East in 2011
As the college football landscape continued to change, the Big East also
lost some key members. In September 2011, Syracuse University (Syracuse)
and Pittsburgh announced they would leave the Big East for the ACC.59
WVU accepted an invitation to join the Big 12 in late October 2011.60
Immediately afterward, WVU filed a lawsuit against the Big East in a West
Virginia circuit court. 61 In that complaint, WVU alleged that the Big East
breached fiduciary duties owed to the football schools and that the breach

53. See generally Trs. of Bos. Coll., 2004 Mass. Super. LEXIS 298.
54. Id. at *6.
55. See id. at *8–9.
56. Id. at *1–2.
57. Id. at *26.
58. Gregg L. Katz, Note, Conflicting Fiduciary Duties Within Collegiate Athletic Conferences: A
Prescription for Leniency, 47 B.C. L. REV. 345, 357 (2006). However, the analysis of fiduciary
duties between institutions in a conference is beyond the scope of this Comment.
59. Lenn Robbins, Syracuse, Pittsburgh Leaving Big East for ACC, N.Y. POST, Sept. 18, 2011,
http://www.nypost.com/p/sports/college/football/big_hit_for_big_east_s18WCvu1wABdEy9Y90r3ZJ
.
60. Big 12 Adding WVU, Will Stay 10 Strong, ESPN (Oct. 28, 2011), http://espn.go.com/collegesports/story/_/id/7159905/west-virginia-mountaineers-formally-invited-join-big-12.
61. See generally Complaint for Declaratory Judgment, Breach of Contract, and Injunctive
Relief, W. Va. Univ. Bd. Gov. v. Big E. Conf., No. 11-C-695 (Magnolia Cnty., W. Va. Cir. Ct. Oct.
31, 2011).
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forced the football schools to leave the conference.62 WVU claimed it was
commercially impracticable for it to stay in the conference after other football
schools left and that by seemingly protecting the interests of only the
“basketball schools,” the Big East and its commissioner “breached their
contract to WVU and nullified and voided [all or parts of] the Bylaws.” 63 The
complaint sought judgment that, inter alia, the bylaws were invalid, 64 that the
conference accepted WVU’s offer of immediate withdrawal, 65 and injunctive
relief against enforcement of the withdrawal period.66
In response, the Big East filed suit against WVU in Rhode Island on
November 4, 2011. 67 The complaint alleged that WVU breached its contract
with the Big East by attempting to withdraw and sought specific performance
by WVU of the withdrawal requirements set forth in the Big East bylaws or an
injunction to keep WVU from leaving the Big East before July 1, 2014.68 The
Big East also requested damages based on WVU’s actions. 69 WVU then
moved to dismiss the case or for a stay pending the West Virginia state court
action. 70 In a December 27, 2011 decision, the Rhode Island court denied
WVU’s motion to dismiss the action on all grounds, finding personal
jurisdiction, concluding there was sufficient service of process, and declining
to dismiss the action based on comity with regard to sovereign immunity or
forum non conveniens. 71 However, on February 14, 2012, WVU announced
that it settled the lawsuits with the Big East and would make the move to the
Big 12 for the Fall 2012 season.72 As part of the settlement, WVU will not
only pay an exit fee far above that required by the Big East bylaws, but it also
agreed to have the West Virginia court enter judgment stating that the bylaws
are valid and enforceable.73 The judgment declaring the Big East bylaws valid
is a clear win for the Big East and other conferences moving forward.

62. Id. ¶¶ 29–31.
63. Id. ¶ 34.
64. Id. ¶¶ 49, 61.
65. Id. ¶ 49.
66. Id. ¶¶ 76–77.
67. Complaint, Big E. Conf. v. W. Va. Univ., No. PB-11-6391 (R.I. Super. Ct. Nov. 4, 2011).
68. Id. ¶¶ 1–6.
69. Id. ¶ 7.
70. Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, Big E. Conf. v. W. Va. Univ., No. PB-11-6391, 2 (R.I.
Super. Ct. Nov. 29, 2011).
71. See generally Big E. Conf. v. W. Va. Univ., No. PB-11-6391 (R.I. Super. Ct. Dec. 27, 2011).
72. Ralph Russo & Vicki Smith, WVU Settles Big East Lawsuit, Will Join Big 12, CNSNEWS.COM
(Feb. 14, 2012), http://cnsnews.com/news/article/wvu-settles-big-east-lawsuit-will-join-big-12-0.
73. Id.
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C. The Western Athletic Conference
The Big East was not the only conference that looked to the courts for help
when the period of defection following Nebraska’s move reached its
membership. The Western Athletic Conference (WAC) filed suit in Colorado
against California State University, Fresno (Fresno), the University of Nevada
(Nevada), and the Mountain West Conference in September 2010. 74 The
WAC sought a declaration that Fresno and Nevada were bound by the WAC
bylaws to stay in the conference until June 30, 2012, as well as an injunction
prohibiting these schools from scheduling games that interfere with the WAC
schedule through the 2011–2012 seasons. 75 In October 2010, the two sides
agreed to a settlement. 76 The schools agreed to stay through the 2011–2012
seasons for a reduced withdrawal fee of $900,000 per school, instead of what
the WAC claimed was over $5 million. 77 As this Comment will discuss
below, the WAC and its members may have been influenced by what took
place between the Big 12 and its defecting members a month earlier.
V. THE BIG 12 CONFERENCE AND THE DEPARTURE OF THE UNIVERSITY OF
NEBRASKA
When Nebraska decided to apply to the Big Ten in the summer of 2010, it
was partly based on the reports that other Big 12 schools were looking to leave
for other conferences as well as the fact that the Big Ten has a strong academic
and athletic reputation.78 Colorado also decided to leave the Big 12 in 2010,
moving on to the Pac-10 (which became the Pac-12). 79 Many people feared,
and there were reports, that the Pac-10 was also pursuing other Big 12
teams. 80 Some speculated that if those media reports were true, the movement
amongst conferences would create sixteen team conferences and put other
conferences, like the Big 12, at serious risk of extinction.81 Luckily for the

74. See generally Complaint, W. Athletic Conf. v. Cal. State Univ., Fresno, No. 10 CV-4281
(Colo. D. Ct. Sept. 20, 2010).
75. Id. ¶¶ 16, 19.
76. Michael C. Lewis, Outgoing WAC Teams Will Stay Through 2011–12, SALT LAKE TRIB.,
Oct. 28, 2010, at USU Aggies.
77. Id.
78. Nebraska Accepted, supra note 10.
79. Wendell Barnhouse, United it Stands, BIG 12 CONFERENCE (June 15, 2010),
http://www.big12sports.com/ViewArticle.dbml?DB_OEM_ID=10410&ATCLID=204960432
[hereinafter United it Stands].
80. Id.
81. Id.
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Big 12, the remaining ten teams committed to remain members, 82 at least for
the time being. 83 Most significantly, Texas—one of the highest profile college
programs—committed to stay in the Big 12. 84 This commitment was in
response to a request by the Big 12 for every school to commit to the future of
the conference by June 11, 2010. 85 With that deadline looming, the Nebraska
Chancellor contacted Big Ten Commissioner Jim Delaney and told him that
something would need to happen immediately, if at all.86 So, on June 11,
2010, Nebraska applied to and was accepted for membership by the Big Ten. 87
When Nebraska decided to leave the Big 12 for the Big Ten, the university
was required to comply with provisions in the 2009–2010 Big 12 Conference
Handbook (Handbook) dealing with withdrawal from the conference.88 The
Handbook, in section 3.1, states that a member who decides to withdraw “will
in good faith give Notice not less than two (2) years before the end of the
Current Term.” 89 That institution is then not “entitled to distribution of the
then-current revenues from the Conference after the effective date of its
withdrawal, resignation, or the cessation of its participation in the
Conference.” 90 The Handbook goes on to state that if the other members
believe the withdrawal will cause a financial hardship that cannot be
calculated, the withdrawing member’s distributions will be reduced by 50%
and that money will be redistributed to the other members. 91 It also states that
“[i]nstitutions agree that such reduction in the amount of revenues distributed
to a Withdrawing Member is reasonable and shall be in the form of liquidated
damages and not be construed as a penalty.” 92 This provision is a strong
statement, and it seems to be intended to protect the Big 12 from being
challenged about the 50% rule. This provision, the Big 12 would likely claim,
is necessary to ensure the survival of the conference when a major revenue-

82. Id.
83. Texas A&M and Missouri subsequently left for the Southeastern Conference (SEC). Pete
Thamel, Texas A&M Sets a Date to Leave the Big 12, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 1, 2011, at B12; Missouri
Leaving Big 12 for SEC, FOX SPORTS (Nov. 7, 2011), http://msn.foxsports.com/collegefootball/story
/Missouri-leaving-Big-12-for-SEC-110611.
84. See United it Stands, supra note 79.
85. Henry J. Cordes, The Big Ten Decision, BIG RED TODAY BLOG (Aug. 30, 2010),
http://www.omaha.com/article/20100830/BIGRED/708309872.
86. Id.
87. Nebraska Accepted, supra note 10.
88. HANDBOOK, supra note 13, art. III, §§ 3.1–3.3, at 13–14.
89. Id. art. III, § 3.1, at 13.
90. Id.
91. Id. art. III, § 3.2, at 13–14.
92. Id.
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contributing institution decides to withdraw.
Withdrawing from the Big 12 without giving proper notice is an entirely
different situation for the institutions. The Handbook refers to any institution
giving notice, other than proper notice under section 3.1, as a breaching
member. 93 It further states that the breaching member agrees that the breach
will cause financial hardship to the remaining members of the conference and
that the amount could not be measured when the agreement was made. 94 The
agreement specifies that if the notice is given less than two years before the
effective date, the breaching member’s revenue will be reduced by between
70% and 100%. 95 If Nebraska was determined to be a breaching member,
80% of the aggregate revenue due to Nebraska after its withdrawal would have
been withheld by the conference. 96 If Nebraska’s distributions were less than
the aggregate amount withheld, the Big 12 would assess an amount equal to
the difference, which Nebraska would be required to pay. 97 This would be a
significant amount of revenue for Nebraska, or any other school in that
situation. It might even be prohibitive, or at least act as a deterrent for a
school that is considering leaving the Big 12 for another conference.
Again, the Big 12 protects itself by specifying that its member institutions
agree that “reduction[s] in the distribution of revenues to a Breaching Member
is reasonable and shall be in the form of liquidated damages and not be
construed as a penalty.” 98 This makes it much harder for a member institution
to challenge the amount withheld in court because it becomes a part of the
contract in the form of liquidated damages. If it were construed as a penalty,
the school might be able to argue that the Big 12 was making a unilateral
decision not in accordance with the contract, and the provisions might be
voided.
Based on these provisions, the Big 12 initially sought to recover 80% of
Nebraska’s projected distributions from 2009–2010 and 2010–2011. 99 It also
sought to retain 80% of Colorado’s actual payout for 2009–2010 and expected
payout for 2010–2011. 100 Both Nebraska and Colorado contended that the
payments should not be required because the Big 12 was on the verge of
93. Id. art. III, § 3.1, at 13.
94. Id. art. III, § 3.2, at 13–14.
95. Id. art. III, § 3.3, at 14.
96. See id.
97. See id.
98. Id.
99. Nebraska, Big 12 Agree to Settlement, ESPN (Sept. 21, 2010), http://sports.espn.go.com/ncf/
news/story?id=5601182 [hereinafter Nebraska Settlement].
100. Colorado, Big 12 Agree to Early Exit, ESPN (Sept. 22, 2010), http://sports.espn.go.com/ncf
/news/story?id=5601601 [hereinafter Colorado Settlement].
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collapse at the time of the withdrawals.101 Although each side contended it
had a very strong case and were firm in their positions, the Big 12, Nebraska,
and Colorado all determined it was better to settle rather than litigate the
disagreement. 102 Under the terms of the settlement, the Big 12 was entitled to
withhold $9.255 million of Nebraska’s estimated $19 million revenue due to
the university during its final two years of affiliation with the Big 12. 103 Both
sides said that it was a fair settlement for all parties. 104
Those statements are likely colored by what resulted from the conference
shift, rather than the legal positions of the parties. The Big 12, and its thenCommissioner Dan Beebe, 105 accepted the roughly $10 million conciliation by
Nebraska because of the fact that the conference survived. If Texas had
decided to leave the Big 12 at that time, and other remaining members
followed, the Big 12 very well may have collapsed and would have been more
willing to litigate in an effort to recover a full 80% of Nebraska’s share.
Alternatively, it may not have been able to sue at all because the Big 12 would
no longer exist. From Nebraska’s standpoint, it was an investment to give up
almost $10 million in order to enter the Big Ten.106 If Nebraska did not
believe its new conference affiliation would make up for the loss, it, too, may
have been more willing to take its chances in court.
From the Big 12’s perspective, 2010 could have resulted in extinction, but
instead ended in sizeable, but not seismic, changes. However, it is not clear
that anyone, including members of the Big 12, expected the changes to
continue. The conference realized that in order to encourage stability and to
encourage member institutions to stay, it had to renegotiate its media contracts
to increase overall revenue. 107 It was able to do that, 108 but even a new TV
contract could not discourage some members from leaving. 109
Because change did continue to happen after Nebraska decided to leave
101. Nebraska Settlement, supra note 99; Colorado Settlement, supra note 100.
102. Nebraska Settlement, supra note 99; see Colorado Settlement, supra note 100.
103. Perlman Discusses Settlement with Big 12 Conference, HUSKERS.COM (Sept. 21, 2010),
http://www.huskers.com/ViewArticle.dbml?DB_OEM_ID=100&ATCLID=204998501.
104. Id.
105. Dan Beebe resigned in September 2011 because of the instability in the conference. See Big
12 Boss Dan Beebe Steps Down, Wishes League ‘Prosperous Future’, SPORTSDAYDFW (Sept. 22,
2011), http://www.dallasnews.com/sports/college-sports/20110922-source-dan-beebe-resigns-as-big12-commissioner.ece.
106. Perlman Discusses Settlement with Big 12 Conference, supra note 103.
107. United it Stands, supra note 79.
108. Andy Staples, Who’s Laughing Now? Beebe, Big 12 Hit Paydirt with Fox Sports TV Deal,
SI.COM (Apr. 14, 2011), http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2011/writers/andy_staples/04/13/big.12.tv.
deal/index.html.
109. See Thamel, supra note 83; see also Missouri Leaving Big 12 for SEC, supra note 83.
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the Big 12, the next part of this Comment will make several recommendations
to conferences, including the Big 12, which may help protect the conferences
from dissolution after the loss of a major program. These recommendations
are wide-ranging and will not necessarily be applicable to every situation.
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS
The Big 12 can exist because of the contractual relationships that it has
with its member institutions. Although the Big 12 acts in the interests of every
member institution, when one or more institution decides to withdraw from the
conference, the Big 12 must not only protect its remaining members, but it
must also adequately protect itself to ensure that the conference can continue
in the future. Because the conference exists through contracts, it must protect
itself using those same contracts to carefully impose obligations on members
and provide for adequate remedies after a member’s withdrawal. The big
question, then, is how can the Big 12 and other athletic conferences adequately
protect themselves from part of their membership leaving and forcing the
conference to dissolve?
Unfortunately for conferences, there is not one simple provision or term
that can be added to every agreement that will ensure survival. Conferences
are not corporations and, consequently, do not enjoy the benefit of perpetual
existence.110 Therefore, conferences must look at new types of terms to
include in their agreements and determine how to best leverage themselves in
the negotiations with universities when beginning a relationship.
One way that a conference might attempt to keep universities from leaving
is by setting the damages that each university must pay on a scale based on the
conference that the university leaves for. For example, Nebraska might have
been less eager to move to the Big Ten if the contractual damages owed were
twice what Nebraska would owe to the Big 12 if it had moved to a conference
like the Big East. Many colleges follow this model when drafting coaching
contracts. 111 When the university knows that another specific school has great
interest in its coach, the university might have a different buyout amount or
buyout scale than the scale that would be applicable to all other jobs that the
coach might leave for. 112 In those contracts, the increased buyout acts as a
barrier to a new job for the coach.
However, if the Big 12 had required Nebraska to forfeit all revenue over
110. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 44, at 391.
111. See Memorandum from Robert H. Lattinville, Partner, Stinson, Morrison, Hecker, L.L.P., to
Attendees of Marquette Univ. Nat’l. Sports L. Inst. 2010 Fall Conf. (Oct. 22, 2010) (on file with
author) [hereinafter Memorandum].
112. See id.
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its final two years because Nebraska left for the Big Ten but only 50% if
Nebraska left for another conference, the Big 12 would need to show that it
was damaged twice as much by Nebraska’s defection to the Big Ten as it
would have been if Nebraska had gone to the Pac-10 or the Big East in order
to justify the additional damages. This justification would be hard, if not
impossible to do, so the conference likely could not use this type of provision.
Another possibility is that conferences could change the structure of the
damages. Currently, the Big 12 simply withholds a predetermined percentage
of the revenue due to the university. 113 One way that the conference might
change this is to withhold a certain percentage of regular season revenue and
all postseason revenue. For FBS conferences like the Big 12, that means that
any school participating in a championship game (if the conference has one),
national title game, BCS bowl game, or the NCAA basketball tournament
would automatically forfeit all revenue from these events, as well as the
predetermined percentage of regular season revenue.
The Big East decided to take a different approach to structuring damages
in two ways. In 2011, the conference amended its bylaws, specifically section
11.02, to require a withdrawal fee of $10 million dollars for schools joining
the conference at the same time as, or after, the Naval Academy (Navy) or the
Air Force Academy. 114 This is double the amount that schools that were
already members of the Big East before that time are required to pay, both
under the 2008 bylaws and after the 2011 amendment. 115 The conference also
plans to fully enforce its provision requiring withdrawal to be at least twentyseven months after notice is received, calling that provision “airtight.”116
Because Pittsburgh, Syracuse, and WVU were members of the Big East before
Navy decided to join, 117 the larger withdrawal fee is inapplicable. Whether
the twenty-seven-month waiting period can be enforced is still unknown, as
WVU and the Big East ultimately settled their legal dispute before a court
could rule on the matter.

113. HANDBOOK, supra note 13, art. III, § 3.3, at 14.
114. BIG EAST CONF., THE BIG EAST CONFERENCE AMENDED AND RESTATED BYLAWS AS OF
OCTOBER 17, 2011, art. XI § 11.02, at 12 (2011) (on file with author) [hereinafter 2011 BYLAWS].
115. Id; BIG EAST CONF., THE BIG EAST CONFERENCE AMENDED AND RESTATED BYLAWS AS
OF MARCH 12, 2008, art. XI § 11.02, at 12 (2008) (on file with author). Therefore, Pittsburgh,
Syracuse, and WVU would have had to pay only five million dollars each to withdraw. Big 12
Adding WVU, Will Stay 10 Strong, supra note 60.
116. Big 12 Adding WVU, Will Stay 10 Strong, supra note 60; see 2011 BYLAWS, supra note
114, § 11.02, at 12.
117. Big 12 Adding WVU, Will Stay 10 Strong, supra note 60; Navy to Play Big East Football in
2015, ESPN (Jan. 24, 2012), http://espn.go.com/college-football/story/_/id/7495168/navymidshipmen-join-big-east-football-2015.
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Conferences could also attempt to guarantee their economic well-being
even without changing the agreements with their member universities. One
way that might be possible is to do so through insurance. There is currently
insurance available to cover coaching bonuses that are tied to on-field
performance. 118 The benefit to using insurance is that the involved university
knows how much its cost for the coach will be, based on salary and the
insurance premium. 119 Although it is not clear that this is completely feasible,
a conference might be able to convince an insurance company to write a policy
that would pay the conference certain amounts that are based on postseason
competition. For example, if a Big 12 team made the Final Four in men’s or
women’s basketball, or if a football team won the national championship, the
Big 12 could collect a certain payout from insurance. The conference would
pay a premium, which it no doubt would pay by withholding additional funds
from the member schools’ payouts. Then, if a team won and the insurance
paid, the conference would receive enough additional revenue to offset the
increased payout to the university. That way, the conference would retain
additional funds for itself and have a sounder financial situation even if a
member school left.
The other way to guarantee a certain amount of revenue for a conference
without having to renegotiate its contracts with the member universities is
through its media contracts. The National Football League was guaranteed to
receive $4 billion in television revenues for the 2011 season, even if no games
were played due to a labor lockout.120 College athletic conferences could
attempt to negotiate the same type of deal in their future media contracts. The
biggest question would be whom the conferences are trying to negotiate with
and whether the conference has enough viewership and probable advertisers to
leverage the network. If a conference like the Big 12 could negotiate some
guaranteed revenue from media contracts, it would, at least to a certain extent,
offset any revenue loss due to the withdrawal of a member. This seems highly
improbable though, especially in light of the fact that the Big 12’s latest TV
deal with Fox was contingent on the Big 12 having at least ten members. 121
A conference can also attempt to control its members’ actions through the
media rights and revenues that the conference receives from those contracts.
The first step is to share revenue equally. When each member of the
conference receives equal revenue from the media contracts, it is in the best

118. Memorandum, supra note 111.
119. See id.
120. NFLPA Files Challenge to TV Deals, ESPN (June 10, 2010), http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/
news/story?id=5268239.
121. See Big 12 Adding WVU, Will Stay 10 Strong, supra note 60.
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interest of each school to want stability and exposure for all of the other
members of the conference. When one school makes more money, all of the
member schools make more money. The Pac-12, the Big Ten, the
Southeastern Conference, and the ACC all share media revenue equally
amongst their members. 122 In October 2011, the Big 12 also agreed to share
revenue equally. 123 This agreement means that the schools will share all
revenue from Tier I and Tier II broadcast rights for football and men’s
basketball. 124 However, it allows schools to keep revenue from Tier III
network rights, which includes Texas’ Longhorn Network. 125
The second step is to require conference members to grant their rights to
the conference. The Big Ten and Pac-12 both already require their member
institutions to assign media rights to the conference.126 They also enjoy great
stability, which may not be a direct result of the revenue sharing and pooling
of media rights, but that certainly has something to do with it. The Big 12
member schools seem to understand this, because instead of stopping at equal
revenue sharing, the members voted to require all schools to grant their media
rights to the conference for a minimum of six years.127 Therefore, even if a
school were contemplating leaving the Big 12 for another conference, the
school would be very reluctant to do so because it would not own its media
rights. 128
Just as it takes more than one conference to create defection and the chaos
that has occurred since June 2010, more than one conference can be part of the
solution. The Big Ten and Pac-12 announced a partnership at the end of 2011
that will provide more inter-conference games and cross promotion on each

122. A Look at Revenue Sharing in the Big 12, KANSAS CITY STAR, Oct. 3, 2011,
http://www.kansascity.com/2011/10/03/3185173/a-look-at-revenue-sharing-in-the.html.
123. Erick Smith, Big 12 Announces Equal Revenue-Sharing Agreement Among Schools, USA
TODAY, Oct. 3, 2011, http://content.usatoday.com/communities/campusrivalry/post/2011/10/big-12revenue-sharing-agreement-grant-broadcast-rights/1.
124. Id.
125. Id. Not surprisingly, Texas originally proposed the model that was agreed to. Big 12
Presidents Approve Revenue Sharing, SI.COM (Oct. 3, 2011), http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2011/
football/ncaa/10/03/Big.12.revenue.ap/index.html.
126. See Big East Was Planning TV Before Losses, ESPN (Oct. 19, 2011),
http://espn.go.com/college-sports/story/_/id/7124201/big-east-schools-were-working-giving-tv-rightsconference-losses.
127. Smith, supra note 123.
128. This is an even bigger hurdle in the Big Ten, where the conference owns the rights for
twenty years. A Look at Revenue Sharing in the Big 12, supra note 122. The Big East was also
reportedly working on pooling media rights before Pittsburgh and Syracuse decided to leave the
conference. Big East Was Planning TV Before Losses, supra note 126.
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conference’s respective network. 129 Big Ten Commissioner Jim Delaney said
that the agreement is in lieu of further expansion. 130 This creates no incentive
for any school in either conference to leave because not only are the schools’
media rights owned by their conferences, but each conference will be able to
profit from the success of the other conference. This is not practical for all
conferences, however, as the partnership likely requires conferences of similar
reputations and revenue.
Each of the possible provisions discussed may help protect a conference
like the Big 12 when a university decides to withdraw from membership. To
implement these solutions, the conference must have the bargaining power to
require the members to agree to the provisions. Because a conference is a
joint venture association by its members, it actually makes sense that once the
conference is no longer a viable option for all of the members, it would
dissolve. However, because there is a limit on available FBS universities,131 it
is not practical for an entire conference to dissolve every time one university
wishes to switch conferences. Therefore, something must be done to keep the
conferences stable going into the future.
VII. CONCLUSION
In the end, a conference’s ability to protect itself from defection comes
down to leverage in negotiations with member institutions, media companies,
and other conferences. The Big 12 and other conferences have made great
strides toward long-term stability by requiring the schools to share the
conference-generated media revenue equally and requiring the schools to
assign their media rights to their conferences. This gives the conferences
greater bargaining power to negotiate with media networks and other
conferences to generate even higher revenue than the conferences have
enjoyed previously.
Just as many things in the world, conference realignment is all about
money. Universities want to increase revenues and seek out the conferences
that provide the best opportunity for those revenue increases, along with the
best on-field competition. As long as the conferences can maintain this
advantage and enforce their agreements to own each school’s media rights,
there will be more and more stability in FBS football. Whether those
129. Steve Wieberg, Big Ten, Pac-12 Expand Alliance, USA TODAY, Dec. 29, 2011, at SPORTS
2C.
130. Id.
131. There are currently 120 Division I FBS Schools. Differences Among the Three Divisions:
Division I, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/public/ncaa/about+the+ncaa/who+we+are/
differences+among+the+divisions/division+i/about+division+i (last updated Dec. 7, 2011).
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agreements are enforceable is something that has not yet been challenged.
When that time comes, a whole new period of chaos could be what college
football holds in store.
Benjamin I. Leibovitz

